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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The opinion originally issued in this matter correctly 
mandates that the State should be prevented from making reference 
to the Section 76-5-202(1)(q), Utah Code, aggravating factor in the 
penalty trial on remand because of the principal of res judicata. 
This Court did not misconstrue or overlook material facts, 
statutes, or decisions, or base its original decision on some wrong 
principal of law, or misapply or overlook something which 
materially affected its original decision. The original opinion 
should therefore not be reconsidered or reheard. 
ARGUMENT 
AT THE REMANDED PENALTY TRIAL, PRINCIPALS OF RES JUDICATA 
PREVENT THE STATE FROM INTRODUCING EVIDENCE, REQUESTING 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS, ARGUING, OR OTHERWISE RE-LITIGATING 
WHETHER APPELLANT'S ACTS WERE COMMITTED IN AN ESPECIALLY 
HEINOUS, ATROCIOUS, CRUEL, OR EXCEPTIONALLY DEPRAVED 
MANNER. 
Respondent recognizes that the original jury in this case was 
misinstructed at both the guilt and penalty phases as to the 
meaning of the Section 76-5-202(1)(q) aggravating factor. 
Nevertheless, Respondent argues that at the remanded penalty trial 
it should be allowed to introduce evidence relevant to such 
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aggravating factor, properly instruct the new jury on its meaning, 
and re-argue the identical issue litigated at the original guilt 
and penalty trials because Section 76-3-207(2) does not preclude 
introduction of such aggravating factor but rather allows 
introduction of "any matter the court deems relevant to sentence, 
...." The State argues that it could have chosen to allege and 
prove any one of the statutory aggravating factors of Section 76-5-
202 while reserving any other one or more of such aggravating 
factors for use at the penalty phase. The crux of Respondent's 
argument is that the State does not need to properly prove an 
aggravating factor beyond a reasonable doubt at the guilt phase as 
a prerequisite to use of the same factor at the penalty phase. 
Respondent may well be correct in this interpretation of its 
parameters under Section 77-3-207(2). It appears that the section 
probably does not specifically prevent the state from arguing an 
aggravating factor that it did not allege or attempt to prove at 
the guilt phase. And, the aggravating factors of Section 76-5-2 02 
are specifically designated as aggravating factors for purposes of 
sentencing, as well. It appears that had the State only alleged and 
put on evidence as to one aggravating factor, Section 76-3-207(2) 
would not have directly and independently prevented it from 
introducing evidence on and arguing an entirely different 
aggravating factor at the penalty phase. 
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However, Respondent argues principals that apply to 
circumstances which are not relevant to the present status of the 
case. The State is not now attempting to argue an aggravating 
factor that was reserved or "held back" from the original guilt or 
penalty trials. Rather, Respondent urges that an issue that it has 
previously and vigorously argued and lost should be re-litigated on 
remand. Had the State - in both the original guilty and penalty 
trials - not introduced evidence, requested instructions, and 
argued the identical issue, its position in the Petition may be 
well taken. But the State is now attempting to argue for the use 
and application of the 76-5-202(1)(q) aggravating factor as if for 
the first time. And, the principals of res judicata prevent the 
State from introducing and arguing what the statutory law would 
otherwise allow. 
"Although the concept of res judicata and collateral estoppel 
originally developed in connection with civil litigation, they 
apply in criminal as well as civil cases;" 21 Am Jur 2nd 560, 
section 321, citing cases including Hoaa v New Jersey, 356 US 464 
and State v Erwin, 120 P2nd 285. This Court has previously 
determined that the principal of res judicata is comprised of two 
separate concepts, ie: claim preclusion and issue preclusion, 
Searle Bros, v Searle, 588 P2nd 689, Penrod v Nu Creation Creme, 
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Inc., 669 P2nd 873, Noble v Noble, 761 P2nd 1369, and Madsen v 
Borthwick. 769 P2nd 245. This Court has likewise ruled that-
Under the rules of issue preclusion, the 
adjudication of an issue bars its re-litigation in 
another action only if four requirements are met. First, 
the issue in both cases must be identical. Second, the 
judgment must be final with respect to that issue. Third, 
the issue must have been fully, fairly, and competently 
litigated in the first action. Fourth, the party who is 
precluded from litigating the issue must be either a 
party to the first action or a privy of a party. Madsen, 
supra. 
It seems clear that the "heinous/atrocious" issue as well as 
the parties in the original trial are identical to those in the 
trial on remand and that the "heinous/atrocious11 issue, being 
central to the capital charge as well as to the determination of 
sentencing, was fairly and completely litigated in the former 
trials. What is not so clear is whether the issue has reached final 
judgment and whether the prior proceedings constitute "another 
action" as that term applies to the principal of issue preclusion. 
The proper sentence to be imposed in this matter is, of 
course, not finally determined. However, whether or not Appellant 
committed an "heinous\atrocious" act has been finally determined by 
virtue of this Court's reversal of that part the verdict and 
judgment based on a finding that that aggravating factor had been 
committed. The State has already attempted and failed to establish 
the merits of that issue. This Court has previously ruled that a 
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claim is finally determined if decided on its merits, Madsen, 
supra. Finality for purposes of issue preclusion would seem to be 
best assessed by the same standards. If so assessed, this issue has 
reached final judgment. 
This counsel has been unable to discover case authority 
bearing directly on the issue of whether Appellant's previous guilt 
trial constitutes "another action" viz a viz his upcoming remanded 
penalty trial, or whether guilt trials generally constitute actions 
which are considered separate from penalty trials, with respect to 
the principals of issue preclusion. However, if the underlying 
concept of issue preclusion is to preclude re-litigation of an 
issue which has been fully, fairly, and competently litigated by 
the same parties (as is the case here), then a strict adherence to 
an otherwise commonly recognized definition of the term would 
thwart the spirit of the principal. The emphasis should be on the 
fact that the State has already been afforded a fair opportunity to 
establish this same issue as against this same Appellant in another 
setting (the guilt phase). That the other setting does not have a 
different case number or isn't brought in a separate Information 
and thus may not constitute "another action" as that term is 
customarily used, should not be determinative. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
The "heinous\atrocious" allegation against Appellant was 
fully, fairly, completely, and competently litigated between these 
same parties in a previous adversarial setting. While the 
directives of the relevant statutory law might otherwise seem to 
allow the State to introduce evidence on this same issue at the 
remanded penalty trial, principals of issue preclusion preclude the 
State from reasserting and protect Appellant from re-defending 
against the same issue. Correct application of the principals of 
issue preclusion to the facts of this case will not broadly nor 
improperly affect the State's claimed statutory right in other 
future cases to pick and "reserve" proof of aggravating factors for 
use in penalty phases, only. This Court has not overlooked or 
misapplied an issue of fact or law which would justify reargument, 
rehearing, or other modification of its original decision. 
Dated this 5th day of July, 1989. 
-rC/f 
THOMAS H. MEANS 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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